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I.

Introduction

The Credit for Increasing Research Activities, known colloquially as the R&D Tax Credit,
has lost its way. This conclusion is apparent in light of the undeniable divergence between the
original fundamental aims of the Credit and its practical use today. A liberalized framework for
computing the Credit and the contemporary tax regime have transformed the Credit’s utility in
such a way that it no longer fosters the very purpose it was designed to encourage. To be sure,
the Credit’s initial objective rested on sound policy which supplies the appropriate standard of
reference for the analysis. Our inquiry is focused on business entities that generate R&D Tax
Credits in excess of income and the reasons that surplus Credits are becoming more likely. A
primary contention of this note is that a stockpile of R&D Credits increases the likelihood of
exploitation and threatens the intended benefit to society.
The Credit was first introduced under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.1 The stated
purpose of the Credit was to foster investment in innovation because such activity was deemed
essential to U.S. economic progress.2 At the time, there was concern that American investment
in onshore research and development was inadequate and declining.3 Because research was
considered essential to economic progress and competitiveness, corrective action was necessary.4
In light of the Credit’s impetus, two evaluative measures we will employ are economic progress
and innovation.
1

See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(d)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 221 (1981). As originally
enacted, the credit was contained in subsection 44(F). Id. In 1984, the sections of various tax credits in the Code
were renumbered, and the R&D credit was reassigned to section 30. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98369, § 30, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). In 1986, the R&D credit was again moved within the Code to section 41. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 41, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). Section 41 is where the R&D Tax Credit is
contained today. 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2018). The proposed regulations with respect to the R&D credit were issued when
the credit was originally at section 44(F), but the final credit regulations were promulgated under section 41. See
T.D. 8251, 54 Fed. Reg. 21, 203 (May 17, 1989).
2
See H. R REP. NO. 100–1104, 88 (1988).
3
See S. REP. NO. 97–144, at 76–7 (1981); H. R. REP. NO. 97–201, 111 (1981).
4
See H. R. REPT. NO. 100–1104, 88 (1988).
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Congress concluded that a substantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental
expenditure was needed to overcome the reluctance of many companies to initiate and expand
research programs in light of the significant attendant costs.5 Its salutary objective was to
stimulate innovation and encourage onshore investment in technological advancement.6 The
Credit aimed to incentivize companies to invest in obtaining new knowledge through the
scientific process of experimentation.7 Congress expressed a desire that the Credit not apply too
broadly but also not so narrowly such that only major advances in science and technology were
eligible.8 A fundamental goal of the R&D Tax Credit was to encourage research activity that
otherwise would not otherwise be conducted, hence its “incremental” parlance.9 Examining the
Credit’s objective supplies two additional criteria for evaluation: experimentation and
incremental research.
The Credit, which in essence functions as a government subsidy, was designed to ameliorate
dwindling investment in research by providing a means for companies to offset income tax
liability as a function of their investment in research made through qualified expenditures.10 The
Credit then is a form of subsidy because the Federal Government is choosing to forego tax
revenue it is otherwise entitled to collect and channel it instead as an investment to stimulate
certain research activities.11

Thus, companies that made qualifying research expenditures

(“QREs”) were entitled to claim a nonrefundable tax credit that could be used to offset regular

5

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 120
(1981) [hereinafter ERTA Explanation].
6
See ERTA Explanation supra note 5, at 120. See also Prop. Reg. 1.41-1(a) (1998) (stating that the research credit
"is intended to encourage business firms to perform the technological research necessary to increase innovative
qualities and efficiency of the U.S. economy.").
7
See ERTA Explanation supra note 5, at 120.
8
David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction, Regulatory Interpretation and Policy
Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 69 (2004).
9
See 135 CONG. REC. S13114, S13125 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989).
10
See H. R. REP. NO. 97–201 at 111.
11
Id.
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income tax liability for the year the credits were generated.12 A sunset provision automatically
ending the credit’s effect absent further action was included in the 1981 Act, effectively making
the Credit a temporary provision.13 The main reason for the temporary designation was due to
concern over the revenue cost of making the credit permanent.14 Indeed, a primary challenge is
how to reasonably guarantee federal revenue foregone in the form of tax credits dollars is
actually being used to perpetuate technological advancement.15 Further, the R&D Tax Credit’s
original objective does not contemplate continuing tax relief for research that has already
concluded or halted because Credits was required to be applied to income in the year they were
generated.16 Considering the choice of a tax credit to achieve the stated purpose and reasons for
its temporary nature, we then must look to revenue costs as yet another evaluative measure.
Distributing tax credits also has a societal cost.17 The social welfare cost of the tax credit
depends on the nature of the tax used to collect funds to pay for the Credit itself.18 Ideally, the
value of the Credit should equal the expected value of the research to the inventor and the
expected value of the research to society.19 Even if a given research objective does not result in
a commercial success, innovative knowledge may still be obtained that has utility in some other
endeavor.20 Such a positive externality is known as a “spillover effect.”

12

21

At some point

Id.
See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221(d)(1); S. REP. NO. 97-144 (1981); H. R. REP. NO. 97-201 (1981).
14
Stephen E. Shay et. al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419,
434 (2016).
15
See generally Shay supra note 14, at 442 (discussing policy justifications for subsidizing R&D).
16
See ERTA Explanation supra note 6, at 120.
17
Shaun P. Mahaffy, The case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L. J. 812, 826
(2013).
18
See Mahaffy supra note 17, at 826.
19
See Mahaffy supra note 17, at 826.
20
Shay supra note 14, at 427.
21
Evan Wamsley, The Definition of Qualified Research Under the Section 41Research and Development Tax
Credit: Its Impact on the Credit’s Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV 165, 185 (2001).
13
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though, the cost to society can outweigh the benefit of the subsidy for a particular endeavor.22
Spillovers aside, the subsidy was intended to redound to the benefit of society, writ large.23
Absent a benefit to society, the Credit’s utility is vitiated.24 Thus, the benefit to society must be
considered as a final evaluative measure.
The R&D Tax Credit has been assumed by some authorities to induce two dollars of
spending for every one credit dollar realized.25

In 2013, it was estimated that businesses

received approximately $11 billion dollars in research credits across all sectors.26 According to
recent estimates, U.S. companies will receive more than $25 billion dollars of R&D incentives in
2019 and 2020. 27

The majority of this figure will comprise self-reported R&D Tax Credits

claimed on company tax returns.28 Such an expenditure by the federal government demands
careful scrutiny. The trick is to ensure this money is being deployed in the spirit of the original
intent.
The R&D Tax Credit appears somewhat stable in isolation today, but contemporary tax
policy has led to significant changes in the way it can be used. The credit was renewed fifteen
times until it was ultimately made a permanent via the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes
(“PATH”) Act of 2015.29 With permanency, businesses could reasonably rely on the Credit’s
availability and incorporate its benefits into their overall tax planning strategy. In addition to
making the Credit permanent, the PATH Act made two key modifications to how the Credit
22

See Wamsley supra note 21,at 186; Shay supra note 14, at 443 (noting a distinction between basic research,
applied research, and experimental development, indicating developmental R&D has a reduced societal return)
23
See Wamsley supra note 21, at 187 (suggesting that ideally the Credit would be structured such that an entity will
receive a sufficient payoff so that is carries out the same projects that society as a whole would choose to undertake).
24
See Wamsley supra note 21, at 186 (noting that for the Credit to be effective, the benefits of the research must
outweigh the costs to society).
25
See Martin A. Sullivan, Putting the Research tax Credit to the Test, 142 TAX NOTES 1223, 1223 (2014).
26
See Tax Stats supra note 181, at Table 1. (revealing an $11.29 Billion credit award across all business sectors in
tax year 2013).
27
Israel Klein, Contemptuous Tax Reporting, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2019).
28
Id.
29
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 121, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
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could be utilized.30 The first modification allowed eligible small businesses (“ESBs”) to apply
R&D Tax Credits toward their corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) liability.31 In
general, AMT establishes a tax liability floor that functions to limit the extent to which
deductions and credits can be utilized by a taxpayer in a given year.32 To determine AMT
liability, the standard income tax is first calculated to which regular tax breaks and marginal rates
apply.33 This result is then compared to an AMT threshold, which is typically computed at a
lower tax rate with most deductions and credits omitted.34 The taxpayer must pay the AMT
figure if the standard calculation results in a lower tax liability.35 Prior to the PATH Act,
corporate taxpayers were subject to a twenty-percent AMT that could not be offset with the R&D
Tax Credit.36 The PATH Act represented a policy paradigm shift that removed this bar for
ESBs.37 For the first time, certain taxpayers could utilize R&D Tax Credits to offset their AMT
burden.38 Thus, after the PATH ACT, ESBs were potentially able to generate enough credits to
eliminate or exceed all of their tax liability for a given year.
The second PATH Act modification to the R&D Tax Credit allowed qualified small
businesses (“QSBs)39 to elect to claim the R&D Tax Credit as a payroll tax credit that can
applied to offset required employer contributions to Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
(“OASDI”).40

The OASDI program is administered by the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) and provides benefits to qualified retired and disabled workers, their dependents, and to
30

See id.
Id. § 121(b). See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A); id. at § 38(c)(4)(B)(ii).
32
Klein supra note 27, at 1162.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, § 121(b).
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A) (defining qualified small businesses, not to be confused with eligible small businesses
under § 38(c)(5)(C)). ).
40
See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub at § 121.
31
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survivors of insured workers.41 Almost all employers are must make OASDI contributions for
their employees.42

OASDI contributions represent the social security portion of every

employer’s payroll tax liability arising out of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(“FICA”).43 The payroll tax credit option is of particular value to a QSB that has incurred losses
or had no income tax liability because previously the Credit could only be used to offset regular
income tax would therefore be unusable until income was generated.44 Under this provision, the
Credit can have immediate tax-offsetting effect for an entirely new category of taxpayer.45
Because of the payroll tax credit election for QSBs, the Credit morphed into a pseudo-refundable
variant because QSBs could realize a payroll tax offsetting benefit even if no income was
generated; all other entities would be forced to carry the surplus to other tax years.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) of 2017 enhanced the dollar-for-dollar potency of the
R&D Tax Credit by lowering the maximum corporate income tax rate form thirty-five percent to
twenty-one percent.46

Reducing regular income tax rates plainly makes the Credit more

powerful because each dollar has more force to eliminate preliminary tax liability. While the
AMT remained intact for individual taxpayers, the TCJA removed the corporate AMT entirely.47
Where PATH Act cracked the door by allowing only ESBs to offset AMT with the R&D Tax
Credit, the TCJA opened the floodgates by removing the corporate AMT threshold altogether.48
The resounding impact of the TCJA is that many businesses will be able to offset much more of
41

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 9 (2018)
[hereinafter SSA Bulletin] (providing an overview of the program’s administration and utilization).
42
See id.
43
See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in federal Income Taxation: the Year 2015, 18 FLA. TAX.
REV. 275, 308 (2016).
44
I.R.C. § 41(h). See also I.R.C. § 38(c)(1) (allowing general business credits to be claimed to the extent to which
they exceed twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000).
45
See I.R.C. § 41(h).
46
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 12001(b)(1), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (amending I.R.C. §
38(c)(6)(E) (2012)) (lowering the corporate income tax rate).
47
Id.
48
See id.
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their income tax liability, increasing the likelihood of a surplus.49 This note endeavors to explore
the how increased force of the Credit creates an incentive for exploitation and has the potential to
forestall the Credit’s very objective. Does a large Credit stockpile is generated that may exceed
income tax liability for decades incentive new research?
In addition to tax reform, contemporary jurisprudence and the Treasury Regulations have
liberalized key rules for computing QREs50 and taxpayer reporting.51 The Code sets forth a fourpart test to identify eligible research expenditures.52

The elements of this inquiry are

summarized as the “Section 174 test,” the “technological in nature test,” the “business
component test,” and “process of experimentation test.”53 While the Code provides initial
guidance, classifying an activity and related expenditures as R&D in nature is a much more
“creative” endeavor than appears at first blush.54

This is largely because the Treasury

Regulations and case law have evinced a liberal framework.55 QREs are now understood to
broadly include employee wages, supply expenses, and contract expenses.56 Moreover, once
stringent contemporaneous record keeping requirements have been relaxed.57 This is largely the

49

See id. See also I.R.C. § 38(c)(1) (allowing general business credits to be claimed to the extent to which they
exceed twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000
50
See Shane T. Frank, et. al., Courts Give Green Light to Claiming R&D Credit for Supplies, 84 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 260, 261 (2010).
51
See Klein, supra note 27, at 1165. See e.g. THOMSON REUTERS, The Impact of Union Carbide on Research Credit
Claims, 110 J. TAX’N 271 (2009) (discussing how the court’s interpretation Qualifying Research Expenditures under
Section 41 leads to favorable taxpayer treatment).
52
I.R.C. § 41(d).
53
Wamsley supra note 21, at 169.
54
Shay supra note 14, at 426.
55
See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-(2); id. at § 1.74-(2); Union Carbide Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. 1207
(T.C. 2009), aff'd, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the section 174 test and asserting its interpretation based
on various sources); TG Missouri Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C.M. 278 (T. C. 2009) (discussing costs related to
process development); Trinity Industries, Inc. v. United States 691 F.Supp.2d 688 (N. D. Tex. 2010) (discussing
costs related to product development).
56
See William R. Swindle, Recent Cases Provide Relief for Substantiating Research Tax Credit Claims, 84 PRAC.
TAX STRATEGIES 316, 317 (2010).
57
Id. at 319.
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result of generous statutory interpretation by the courts.58 The current construct has come to
permit self-reporting and assessment of QREs that makes it possible to report tax positions that
are subject to virtually no administrative oversight and that may not conform to the Tax Code
and prevailing doctrinal principles.59 The liberalized rules for categorizing QREs, and relaxed
reporting requirements all function to create a powerful incentive to artificially inflate QREs.
This incentive is perhaps most irresistible because of the discretion afforded to the taxpayer.
For instance, all entities that have not yet claimed the Credit may do so by filing amended returns
for all open tax years.60 Just as with most business tax credits, the dollar-for-dollar R&D Tax
Credit may carryover if it exceeds tax liability in a given year.61

Moreover, there is no

mandatory requirement to deploy any tax savings to promote ongoing research.62
While the R&D Tax Credit’s original purpose is venerable, contemporary tax policy and a
liberalized administration threaten its integrity.

An evaluative framework considering the

original 1981 policy aims of economic progress, innovation, experimentation, incremental
research, minimizing revenue costs, and promoting societal benefit will be used to analyze the
Credit’s current practical use. Part II sets forth additional background material on the R&D Tax
Credit and the relevant tax policy that influences its practical application. Part III analyzes how
evolving tax policy and liberalized interpretations encourage manipulation and have the potential
to countermand the fundamental purpose of the R&D Tax Credit. As a means to halt this

58

See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.41; Union Carbide, 133 T.C. 278 (rejecting contemporaneous documentation requirement
in favor of substantiation by credible oral testimony); U.S. v. McFerrin, 570 F3d 672 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing
taxpayer to use reasonable estimates to substantiate expenditures for the R&D Tax Credit).
59
See Klein supra note 27, at 1161.
60
MOSS-ADAMS, LLP, Your Guide to Claiming the Federal R&D Tax Credit, 3 (2016),
https://.mossadams.com/getmedia/Moss-Adams_RnD-WhitePaper_rev111516.pdf (noting that a longer retroactive
application period may be possible if the company suffered certain losses and that companion state credits are also
available).
61
See I.R.C. § 39 (limiting the application somewhat in that the credit may be used in the carryover years only to the
extent of the tax liability for that year attributable to the business that generated the credit).
62
See generally I.R.C. § 41 (specifying no requirement for reinvestment).
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undesirable result and restore the intended benefit to the American public, modest but effective
revisions to the Treasure Regulations and the Code are offered for consideration. Specifically, a
taxpayer’s ability to claim the Credit for prior open tax years should be restricted and the
Treasury Regulations need to be modified to more adequately control how businesses categorize
and report research expenditures. Part IV concludes with a summary.
II.

Background and Mechanics of the R&D Tax Credit

The R&D Tax Credit has been modified since its inception in 1981.63 Supporting sections of
the sections of Internal Revenue Code, which impact Credit’s administration, have also
evolved.64 Additionally, the Credit’s practical operation has been shaped through jurisprudence
and clarified in various legislative and official materials.65 Due to the complex interoperation
between these governing materials, it is necessary to supply background information that will be
used as a foundation for analyzing the Credit. This section provides the backdrop against which
our evaluative framework will be used to analyze the Credit in its current form.
A. Evolution of the R&D Tax Credit
Since its inception, the credit has endured multiple iterations of tax reform. Only the most
significant are recounted here. From 1986 to 2006, the administrative policy of the R&D credit
shifted from restricting eligibility to providing simplified access and generous classifications.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the R&D Tax Credit for another year, reduced its rate of
computation, and restricted eligibility.66 Specifically, the amount of the credit was reduced from

63

Compare Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221(d)(1) (setting forth the original provisions of the credit),
with I.R.C. § 41 (containing the credit in its current form).
64
See, e.g. I.R.C. at § 41(d) (requiring research to be eligible for treatment as expenses as described by I.R.C. at §
174 as part of a conjunctive four-part test for eligibility).
65
See, e.g. Union Carbide, 97 T.C.M. 1207 (discussing the section 174 test and asserting its interpretation based on
various sources).
66
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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twenty-five percent of the total QREs to twenty percent.67 The reduction in rate appears to have
been an attempt to lower tax rates and broaden the income tax base rather than in response to an
analysis of the Credit’s prior effectiveness.68 Restricting eligibility addressed mounting concern
that taxpayers were too liberally interpreting the Credit so as to qualify more expenses connected
to product development than initially contemplated.69 The restriction was accomplished by
clarifying the definition of qualified research so as to target only research undertaken to discover
information that was technological in nature and pertaining to functional aspects of products.70
The effect of these changes was to reduce the number of credits generated, thus minding revenue
costs, and ensure the incremental research aim was being fostered.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 then made basic changes to the way the
Credit was calculated.71

First, the notion of a “base amount” of QREs was introduced.72 The

base amount was defined as the product of a taxpayer’s fixed-base percentage and the average
amount of the taxpayer’s gross receipts for the four years preceding the year for which the Credit
is being computed.73

The change was enacted to safeguard the incremental research aim. By

defining a base amount, Congress sought to ensure that only QREs above this fixed baseline
would be countable when computing the Credit. Special provisions were made for “start-up”
companies.74 The start-up provisions addressed how to compute the fixed-base percentage for
companies having both gross receipts and QREs for fewer than three taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1983, and before January, 1, 1989.75 The start-up designation recognized

67

Id. at § 231(c).
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Attacking Innovation, 99 B. U. L. REV. 1687, 1752 (2019).
69
See S. Rept. 99–313, at 695-95 (1986); H. Rept. 99–426, at 117 (1986).
70
See Tax Reform Act of 1986 at § 231(b).
71
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, § 7110 (1989).
72
Id. at § 7110(b) (amending I.R.C. § 41(c)(1)).
73
Id.
74
Id. at § 7110(b)(1).
75
See id. at § 7110(c)(3)(B).
68
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that some companies may not have been engaged in research for a full four years if between the
1983 and 1989 window.

This change expanded accessibility to the Credit, fostering the

innovation and societal benefit aims, but perhaps at the expense of revenue cost.
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 expanded the definition of a start-up
company.76 The revised definition included any firm so long as the first tax year with both gross
receipts and qualified research expenditures occurred after 1983.77 Because of these changes,
any firm first incurring QREs after 1983 can technically be a start-up. A start-up designation
means a streamlined method of computing the base amount and instantaneous access to the
Credit once QREs are made. These changes further expanded access to the Credit and made it
easier for companies to claim its benefit. This possibly promoted innovation and positive
spillover effects by allowing more companies to claim the Credit, but at the expense of revenue
due to an increased likelihood of subsidizing superficial research.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 introduced the Alternative Simplified Credit
(“ASC”).78 The ASC is discussed more completely in subsection C(3) infra, but it essentially
allows a simple percentage-based computation of the Credit over a simplified baseline.79 The
ASC provided all taxpayers with a streamlined method to compute the Credit, but start-ups who
lack legacy accounting records would find this method particularly useful. This change allowed
more companies to access and generate credits. This may have promoted innovation but at the
expense of revenue. It took thirty years, but the Credit has generally developed over its course of
its renewals to tolerate expanded access—virtually any company who even remotely conducts
research can qualify.
76

See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–188, § 1204(b) (1996) (modifying Code section
41(c)(3)(B) of the 1996 Code).
77
See id.
78
See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, PL 109–432, § 104(c) (2006).
79
See id.
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B. Contemporary Tax Policy and its Influence on the R&D Tax Credit
Contemporary tax policy has significantly altered both the way in which the R&D Tax Credit
can be utilized and its tax-offsetting power.

These modifications combine to increase the

likelihood that surplus Credits will be generated and stockpiled. The two most prominent
revisions to the Internal Revenue Code that contributed to this result were the Protecting
Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Section III
discusses how and why a stockpile of Credits contravenes every element of our evaluative
framework; specifically, economic progress, innovation, experimentation, incremental research,
minimizing revenue costs, and maximizing societal benefit.

This subsection explores the

specific features of these Acts that affect the Credit and its use.
1. Effects of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015
The PATH Act made three key changes that significantly impacted the R&D Tax Credit.
The first major substantive reform was to make the R&D Tax Credit permanent.80

This

development is relevant because prior to 2015, the credit was essentially a temporary provision
which required legislative action to extend.81 Businesses often criticized the temporary nature of
the Credit on the ground that attendant uncertainty hindered business and tax planning
activities.82

With permanency, however, businesses could reasonably rely on the Credit’s

availability. Making the Credit permeant was significant because it evidences a shift in policy in
light of Congress’s concern over revenue costs that kept the Credit temporary for over three
decades.83 Thus, this change potentially affects our evaluative measure of revenue costs.

80

Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a) (amending I.R.C. § 41 accordingly). See e.g.
McMahon supra note 43, at 308.
81
See id.
82
Shay supra note 14, at 434. See also Michael D. Rashkin, The Dysfunctional Research Credit Hampers
Innovation, 131 TAX NOTES 1057, 1059-60 (June 6, 2011).
83
Shay supra note 14, at 434.
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The second noteworthy modification was to enable the R&D Tax Credit to offset AMT
for eligible small businesses (“ESBs”).84 An ESB is a privately-held entity with less than $50
million in average annual gross receipts within the prior three years.85 To be sure, the Credit
remained available for all businesses, but the ESB category received special treatment under the
PATH Act. ESBs represent a large portion of the corporate landscape and associated tax
implications are significant.86 In fact, small businesses are estimated to account for as much as
fifty percent of all entities claiming the Credit, though not necessarily fifty percent of the Credits
claimed.87

This is meaningful because the PATH Act enabled a significant number of ESB

taxpayers to offset corporate AMT.88 Corporate AMT is essentially a minimum tax liability that
an entity is responsible for.89 Generally, a taxpayer—individual or corporate—must calculate the
regular tax using the standard schedules of marginal rates, deductions, and credits to determine
liability and compare it with an AMT computation at a prescribed lower rate that omits most
deductions and credits.90 If the regular tax is lower than AMT, the taxpayer must pay the
difference.91

That incremental amount historically could not be offset with the R&D Tax

Credit.92
After the PATH Act, ESBs could use the Credit to offset their corporate AMT.93 As we
will see in the next section C, liberalized rules encourage QRE’s to be artificially inflated,
increasing the amount of credits generated. At least for ESBs, the PATH Act furthered an
84

Id. at § 121(b) (adding section 38(c)(4)(B)(ii) to the Tax Code).
See I.R.C. § 38(c)(5)(C). This is not to be confused with I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A) (defining qualified small businesses
(“QSBs”)).
86
See Lerong He & Yuanlong He, The R&D Tax Credit: What is in it for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses?, 98
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 08 (2017) (quantifying the number of applicants in the small, medium, and large business
sectors and presenting the claimed credit dollars for each).
87
Id. at 3. Note though that in terms of claimed credit dollars, large corporations have dominated. Id.
88
Id. (amending section 38(c)(5)(C) of the tax Code).
89
See I.R.C. § 38(c)(5)(C).
90
E.g. Klein supra note 27, at 1162.
91
Id.
92
See McMahon supra note 43, at 308.
93
Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a).
85
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incentive to inflate expenditures because all of their income tax liability was fair game for the
Credit to offset. Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal
benefit and does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic
progress. Notably, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act extended same the benefit to all corporate
taxpayers.
A third provision of the PATH Act concerns qualified small businesses (“QSBs”).94 Like
ESBs, QSBs represent a special class of taxpayer that received special treatment under the PATH
Act. Other taxpayers could still access the Credit as per usual. A QSB is a partnership,
corporation or person with gross receipts of less than $5 million for the current tax year and no
gross receipts for any tax year preceding the five year tax period ending with the current tax
year.95 For the purpose of the R&D Tax Credit, QSBs represent a subset of the ESB category.
Under the PATH Act, QSBs can elect to claim a certain amount of the R&D Tax Credit as a
payroll tax credit that can be used to offset the employer portion of the Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) for up to five years.96 OASDI contributions represent the social
security portion of almost every employer’s payroll tax liability arising out of the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”).97 Virtually all employers are required to make OASDI
contributions for their employees.98
The ability to utilize the R&D Tax Credit toward payroll tax liability is attractive to
QSBs for two reasons. First, QSBs can claim and realize the benefit of a tax credit even when
they have no income tax liability.99 Second, a QSB has discretion to use the Credit to offset
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See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A).
Id. (defining qualified small businesses, not to be confused with eligible small businesses under § 38(c)(5)(C)).
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See id.; I.R.C. § 3111(f). See e.g. McMahon supra note 43, at 308.
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See e.g. McMahon supra note 43, at 308.
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See SSA Bulletin supra note 41, at 9.
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See He supra note 86, at 9 (providing an example for how the payroll tax credit option works).
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regular income tax liability if it should arise.100 The Credit was thus transformed into a pseudorefundable variant because QSBs have the option to realize a payroll tax offsetting benefit even
if no income is generated; all other entities are forced to carry the surplus to other tax years.
Under the PATH Act, QSBs were also given an incentive to artificially inflate QREs. Any
surplus Credits generated could be stockpiled and deployed at the QSBs sole discretion.
Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs and offers no benefit to society. Such a
maneuver also does nothing to promote experimentation, innovation, or economic progress.
2. Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
The TCJA of 2017 propagated the upside created by the PATH Act of 2015 by increasing the
tax-offsetting power of the Credit. With the increased potency of the Credit, it became much
more likely that a taxpayer would encounter a surplus, meaning generated Credits exceed tax
liability. As section III will discuss, a stockpile of R&D Credits increases the likelihood of
exploitation and threatens the intended benefit to society. This section explores how the TCJA
functioned to increase the force of the Credit. Two modifications to the Code are largely
responsible for this consequence.
The first major change engendered by the TCJA was the complete removal of corporate
AMT.101 This is significant because corporate tax payers are no longer required to compare their
regular income tax liability—including deductions and credits—against a minimum threshold
AMT value.102 Under the TCJA, it is impossible for a corporation to discover that it must pay a
higher AMT than its computed regular tax liability.103 Instead, the opposite is true: Corporations
simply have no AMT liability for the purpose of determining tax credit limitations, and the R&D
100

Id.
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1).
102
See id.
103
See id.
101
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Tax Credit directly offsets regular income tax.104

Utilization of the R&D Tax credit for

corporations is not unfettered though because other provisions of the Code still operate to limit
application.105 For instance, corporations may only claim general business credits to the extent
of twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000.106 Nonetheless,
corporations are no longer constrained by the AMT when offsetting income. Just as the PATH
Act did for ESBs, the TCJA perpetuated an incentive to all corporations previously subject to
AMT to inflate expenditures because now all of their income tax liability was fair game for the
Credit to offset. Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal
benefit and does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic
progress.
The second critical modification by the TCJA was the overall reduction in the corporate
income tax rate from thirty-five percent to twenty-one percent.107 It follows that the dollar-fordollar force of a tax credit is necessarily increased whenever marginal tax rates decrease. Tax
credits generally function to reduce preliminary tax liability and the R&D Tax Credit is no
different.108 Preliminary tax liability is computed as the product of taxable income and the tax
rate.109 Thus, when the tax rate is reduced, a Credit whose value has not decreased will have
more tax-reducing force. This is precisely how the TCJA works to increase the tax offsetting
power of the R&D Tax Credit. Due to the increased potency of the Credit, it is possible that a
corporation can generate more Credits than its income tax liability. This potentially compounds
the incentive for corporations to inflate QREs due to the perceived value of a stockpile.
104

See id.
See I.R.C. § 38(c) (specifying limitations of the application of tax credits to tax liability).
106
See id. at § 38(c)(1)(B). Recall the R&D Tax Credit is still a general business credit Id. Previously, only ESBs
enjoyed special designation under the PATH Act). Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a).
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Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 11(b)).
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See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, Overview of the Federal Tax System as in Effect for 2019 (JCX-9-19)
(2019) (providing an overview of the federal taxation system).
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Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal benefit and does
nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic progress.
Reducing the tax rate works a less obvious but equally compelling benefit for entities
utilizing other Code sections in tandem with the R&D Tax Credit.110 For instance, amortization
of research and experimental expenditures is an available tax deduction under Code section
174.111 Public policy disfavors a double tax benefit and would normally preclude a tax credit
and a tax deduction for the same qualifying expenditure.112 As workaround, the taxpayer is
permitted to elect to take a reduced R&D Tax Credit under Code section 280 so that she may
claim both an R&D Tax Credit and an R&D Tax Deduction.113 Here again, the Credit’s benefit
is a function of the corporate tax rate. Prior to the TCJA, section 280 reduced the Credit thirtyfive percent, matching the maximum corporate tax rate at the time.114 With a Code section
280(C)(c) election, taxpayers could then only apply sixty-five percent of a the computed R&D
Tax Credit if they also wanted to take the R&D Deduction.115
Because the TCJA lowered the corporate income tax rate by fourteen percentage points, the
adjusted Credit required by Code section 280(C)(c) was re-indexed to twenty-one percent.116
Thus, under the TCJA, taxpayers making the same Code section 280(C)(c) election can now
apply seventy-nine percent of the Credit when implementing both section 174 and 41 in
tandem.117 The net effect is a twenty-one and one half percent increase in Credit utilization

110

Yair Holtzman & Sharlene Sylvi, Insight: 2017 Tax Law Changes Increase Value of R&D Credit, BLOOMBERG
L. NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019).
111
See I.R.C. § 174 (specifying the requirements for amortizing research and experimental expenditures).
112
See Id. § 280(C)(c)(1) (prohibiting a Code section 41 credit and Code section 174 deduction to operate in tandem
unless election is made).
113
Id. § 280(C)(c)(3) (permitting both a research expenditure credit and deduction if a reduced credit is elected).
114
I.R.C. § 280(C)(c)(3)(B)(II) (2012) (amended 2017).
115
Id. (subtracting the 35% reduction from the 100% gross credit amount).
116
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 11(b) and Code section 280(C)(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code).
117
See I.R.C. § 280(C)(c)(3)(B)(II).
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capacity. The Credit is therefore more powerful when utilized to offset tax liability. This result
also potentially compounds the incentive for corporations to inflate QREs. Artificial inflation of
QREs has negative externalities that offend every element of our framework.

Given the

increased likelihood of a Credit surplus, the question becomes: At some point will a stockpile
grow to exceed its practical value and cause a company to cease QREs altogether?
C. Determining QREs and Computing the Amount of R&D Tax Credits
In addition to tax reform, contemporary jurisprudence and the Treasury Regulations have
liberalized key rules for computing the Credit, classifying QREs,118 and taxpayer reporting.119
Certain tactical decisions within the province of the taxpayer can significantly influence the
mount of Credit computed in a given year.120 Section III will discuss how artificial inflation of
QREs can lead to a stockpile of R&D Credits that threatens the very aims of our evaluative
framework.

The following subsections outline the dominant considerations and mechanisms

that must be navigated and nuances that should be appreciated when computing and claiming the
R&D Tax Credit.
1. Methods to Compute the Credit
There are two primary procedures available to compute the R&D Tax Credit: the
Traditional (or Regular) method and the Alternative Simplified Credit (“ASC”) method.121 The
regular computation method generally provides a tax credit equal to twenty percent of the tax
118

See Frank supra note 50, at 261.
See Klein, supra note 27, at 1165. See e.g. THOMSON REUTERS, The Impact of Union Carbide on Research
Credit Claims, 110 J. TAX’N 271 (2009) (discussing how the court’s interpretation Qualifying Research
Expenditures under Section 41 leads to favorable taxpayer treatment).
120
See Klein supra note 27, at 1196 (explaining various ways in which companies report qualified expenditures).
121
See I.R.C. at § 41(a)(1) (specifying the traditional method); id. at § 41(c)(4)(A) (specifying the alternative
simplified method). The so-called basic research credit method also exists, but it is limited to corporations, and it
essentially modifies the recognized base period amount. See id. at § 41(e)(7)(E). The details of this method are not
discussed at length herein. Some commentators also cite the so-called reduced credit method. See He supra note
86, at 1196. This method was explained supra in subsection II(B)(2) and arises when a taxpayer makes the Code
section 280(c)(C) election and utilizes the R&D Tax Credit and R&D Tax Deduction in tandem. Id.
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payer’s qualified research expenditures (QREs) over a base amount for that year.122 The base
amount is defined as the product of the so-called fixed-base percentage and the average annual
gross receipts of the taxpayer in the four preceding tax years.123 The taxpayer's base amount
cannot be less than fifty percent of its QREs for the year in which the credit is assessed.124 The
term fixed-base percentage refers to the proportion of aggregate QREs to aggregate gross
receipts the taxpayer incurred based on historical tax years, starting after December 31, 1983 and
ending before January 1, 1989.125 The fixed-base percentage cannot exceed sixteen percent.126
If a company is classified as a start-up, the fixed base percentage is computed differently.127 The
fixed base percentage for a start-up is calculated as three percent of QREs for the first five years
where QREs manifest and then as a scaled average of QREs for successive years.128
Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that a start-up company, as regarded by the Code, is
a nascent business.129 Given the Credit’s framework, a company can be in business many years
and still be considered a start-up company for the purpose of assessing its research activities.130
As an alternate to the traditional method, the ASC provides a streamlined approach to
computation. The ASC value is equal to fourteen percent of the portion of QREs in excess of
fifty percent of the average QREs for the preceding three tax years.131 If a taxpayer has no QREs
in any of the preceding three tax years, the credit is simply computed as six percent of QREs
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made in the current year.132 Electing to use the ASC method can only be revoked with IRS
consent, and it applies to all subsequent tax years.133 While the ASC method contemplates a
reduced credit award when compared to the traditional method, it can be the less burdensome
option for a taxpayer if historic data is unreliable or unavailable. Importantly, a taxpayer is
permitted to make an ASC election for a tax year on an amended return within the timeframe for
filing such a return.134 This option is available for all taxpayers and it can be elected even when
claiming the Credit retroactively for open tax years.135
2. Qualifying Research Activities and Expenditures
Identifying and reporting eligible expenditures are perhaps the most significant factors
affecting the amount of a claimed R&D Credit.136 Recall, U.S. companies stand to receive more
than $25 billion dollars of R&D incentives in 2019 and 2020.137 The majority of this figure will
comprise self-reported R&D Tax Credits claimed on company tax returns.138 An improper
classification or apportionment of expenses, either during everyday accounting or when
preparing either IRS Form 6765 (income tax credit) or Form 8974 (payroll tax credit), can
severely impact the credit computation or prevent eligibility altogether.139 The procedure for
classifying QREs is codified by statute, and the rules promulgated by the Treasury Regulations
and interpreted further by case law.140

132

Id. at §41(c)(4)(B).
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In order for expenditures to qualify for the Credit, certain statutory criteria must be met.141
As a preliminary matter, some activities are expressly disqualified as QREs.142 Disallowed
activities include research after commercial production, adaptation of existing business
component, duplicating an existing business component, surveys and studies, non-sanctioned
computer software development, foreign research, research involving social sciences, and funded
research.143 The TCJA has amended this section such that expenditures for the development of
any software will be expressly considered as QREs after December 31, 2021.144 This is a
noteworthy modification as qualifying research activity connected to software is currently
limited and has been throughout the Credit’s history.145 While historically not qualified, there is
no reason to conclude companies are underinvesting in software in general—quite the
contrary.146 While data is not currently available, it is likely that this change will increase
revenue costs significantly.
QREs are broadly defined as the sum of in-house research expenses and contract research
expenses.147 In-house research expenses include wages paid to employees engaging in qualified
research.148 Notably, qualifying research activity includes the direct supervision or support of
others engaging in research.149 In-house qualifying expenditures also include amounts paid for
supplies, characterized as any tangible property other than land or depreciable property used in
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Id. at § 41(d)(4).
143
See id.
144
Id. at §174(c)(3) (as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13206).
145
See Sara J. O’Connell, No Research and Development Tax Credit for Commercial Software Developers: Tax
Accounting Software Corp. V. United States, 57 TAX LAW. 273 (2003) (providing historical context for how certain
software research expenses became qualified).
146
See id.
147
I.R.C. at § 41(b)(1).
148
Id. at § 41(b)(2).
149
Id.
142

Page 21 of 41

the conduct of qualified research.150 Finally, amounts paid to another person for the right to use
computers while conducting research counts as a QRE, so long as the taxpayer is not
reimbursed.151 Eligible contract research expenses are defined as sixty-five percent of any
amount paid or incurred by the taxpayer to any person other than an employee for qualified
research.152 A three-prong test further qualifies contract research expenses.153 This requires the
contractor to enter into an agreement with the taxpayer prior to performing qualified research,
the research must be conducted on behalf of the taxpayer or the “Rights test,” the taxpayer must
bear the expense of the research even if unsuccessful or “At-Risk test.”154
Code section 41 prescribes a four-part test that must be satisfied for research activity to
qualify for the Credit: the Section 174 Test, the Technological Information Test, the Process of
Experimentation Test, and the Business Component Test.155 The Section 174 test mandates that
expenditures be eligible for treatment as expenses under Code section 174 for R&D Tax
Deductions.156

This essentially means research or experimental expenditures incurred in

connection with the taxpayer's trade or business representing research and development costs in
the experimental or laboratory sense.157
The second element requires the research to be undertaken for the purpose of discovering
eligible information.158 Such information must be technological in nature, the application of
which is intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business component for
150
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the taxpayer.159 There is a discovery requirement which is satisfied if the research is intended to
eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a business component.160
Moreover, the credit is available regardless of whether the taxpayer succeeds or fails in
achieving her objective.161
The third element requires substantially all of the research activities to constitute indicia of a
process of experimentation.162 Four core requirements sufficiently demonstrate satisfaction of
the third element: (1) identifying uncertainty in the development or improvement of a business
component; (2) implementing one or more alternatives intended to eliminate said uncertainty; (3)
specifying a process to evaluate the alternatives; and (4) conducting an evaluative process
through, modeling, simulation, or systematic trial and error.163 As a final point of distinction, the
grant of a U.S. patent is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to claim the R&D Credit.164
A patent does work an advantage though because it serves as conclusive evidence that the
elimination of uncertainty element has been satisfied.165
The fourth, and final, element requires the taxpayer to deliberately set out to discover
information that will be useful in the development of a new or improved business component for
the taxpayer.166 Research satisfies the permitted purpose sub-test if the taxpayer attempts to
improve the function, performance, reliability, or quality of a new or improved business
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component.167

Thus, a process of experimentation is for a permitted purpose if it relates to a

new or improved function, performance, reliability or quality of the business component.168
The issue of how taxpayers claiming the R&D Tax Credit should document and account for
qualified research activities has presented a challenge since inception.169 Prior to 2003, special
recordkeeping requirements established high standards for substantiating expenditures.170 For
example contemporaneous documentation meant research activities needed to be accounted for
in real time.171 However, the burdens of contemporaneous recordkeeping have since been
alleviated.172 Interestingly, the latest regulations do not establish any special documentation
requirements to claim the Credit.173 Instead, taxpayers are directed to simply comply with the
Code’s general recordkeeping requirements.174

Moreover, courts have relaxed the

contemporaneous recordkeeping requirement by allowing reasonable estimates.175

This

liberalization has given rise to three typical methods of accounting used to document research
activities and associated expenditures: the project, departmental, and hybrid methods.176 While
there are nuanced differences between the three methods, they all essentially rely on the principal
of self-reporting.177 Self-reporting means that taxpayers are not beholden to administrative
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oversight.178 With only the risk of ex-ante examination, the current recordkeeping construct
creates fertile ground for abuse through over-allocation of expenditures to research activities.179
It is clear that various tests and guiding principles endeavor to control the kinds of activities
and expenditures that qualify under the credit; however, it is also evident that the strictures have
been relaxed over time. While the framework is salutary in its aim, it is largely unworkable and
exploitable in practice. The process of identifying expenditures is reduced to blind reliance on
corporate records and designations of spending by the very entity that stands to benefit. Indeed,
it is fairly assumed that illicit conduct such as fraud is not a common enterprise; however, the
undeniable incentive to inflate expenditures in light of the Credit’s newfound potency cannot be
ignored. Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal benefit and
does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic progress.
III.

Liberalized Rules Threaten the Integrity of the R&D Tax Credit

In this section our evaluative measures of promoting economic progress, fostering
innovation, encouraging experimentation, recognizing incremental research, minding federal
revenue cost, and maximizing societal benefit are employed to analyze how the Credit has come
to lose its way. While the R&D Tax Credit may appear stable in isolation, there are a number of
ways in which its function in practice strays from its primary objective of increasing research
activities that would not have otherwise been pursued.180

Recall that businesses receive

approximately $11 billion dollars in research credits across all sectors in a given year.181 A
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primary challenge is how to reasonably guarantee federal revenue foregone in the form of R&D
Tax Credits is actually being used to perpetuate technological advancement.182
As we have seen, the tax environment in which the Credit operates has changed. The Credit
itself has also evolved. The rules for qualifying expenditures and computing the Credit have
been liberalized. It is now much more likely that entities will be able to generate Credits that
exceed their regular income tax liability, resulting in a surplus. A primary question to address is
whether a stockpile promotes any of the salutary aims the Credit was designed to achieve. We
contend at some point a stockpile of Credits offends six evaluative measures of our framework.
After discussing the incentives for creating a Credit stockpile and its deleterious effects, this
section concludes with a suggested restructuring to reconcile the divergence between the R&D
Credit’s primary aims and its present utilization.
A. Incentive to Artificially Inflate Qualifying Research Expenditures
There has always been an incentive to make sure no eligible research expenses are
overlooked because the possible R&D Tax Credit is directly proportional to the aggregate
QREs.183 The more QREs a company accumulates, the greater the amount of the computed
R&D Tax Credit. Indeed, at a minimum, the four-part test must be satisfied to comply with the
statute.184 There are, however, numerous expense categories that can prove difficult to police in
practice.185

This is particularly true with the employee wage sub-category of in-house
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expenses.186 Wages are defined to mean all remuneration for services performed by an employee
for her employer, which is a construct adopted from elsewhere in the Code.187 Applying the
statutory four-part test then means if “substantially all” of the services rendered by an employee
during a tax year is spent on research activities, then the entirety of that employee's wage
becomes a QRE for the purposes of the R&D Credit.188 The Treasury Regulations announce that
the “substantially all” threshold is satisfied for a given employee if the time devoted to qualified
research constitutes at least eighty percent of the total time.189
Recall that the recognized categories of employee service include direct research activity,
direct supervision of the same, direct support, or any combination thereof.190 Under the rules
then, the entire wage paid to a given employee who has directly engaged in, supervised,
supported, or otherwise contributed to any research activity is considered a QRE so long as
eighty-percent of her time was dedicated in the effort.191 Considering the self-reporting and
relaxed recordkeeping requirements, it is not hard to imagine “creative accounting” tactics when
assessing whether a given employee has conducted just enough direct, supervisory, or support
activity such that the eighty percent threshold is crossed.192 Administrative feasibility is indeed
desirable, but perhaps the salary of an employee is too significant an expense to “guestimate.”
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The statute does not expressly require an investment in R&D to pay off. In fact, quantifiable
success is not an essential element of the statutory four-part test.193 The real question is how to
properly determine the value of research efforts that cannot be deemed a conventional success.
For instance, there may be a time delay between when the research activity was conducted and
when a property right, product, or other benefit with a positive return materializes.194 Research
is inherently iterative and tentative in nature; the Code by its own terms requires uncertainty to
be addressed via a process of experimentation.195 Even if a given research objective does not
result in a commercial success, innovative knowledge may still be obtained that has utility in
some other endeavor.196 Such a positive externality is referred to as a “spillover effect.”197
Spillover notwithstanding, the R&D Credit has real costs to society and its effectiveness must
be objectively evaluated in the context of its aim of promoting economic progress.198 Today,
researchers need not be demonstrably efficient or effective in their efforts—pyrrhic victories are
acceptable.199 Some amount of “failure” should be tolerated as part of the process, but at some
point the cost to society can outweigh the benefit of the subsidy for a particular endeavor.200 The
issue is that there is currently no mechanism to limit the duration or scope of any QRE that an
entity may be incurring. Thus, the credit can virtually be claimed in perpetuity for a particularly
persistent entity for even superficial research activity. A nefarious taxpayer may choose to
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tenuously maintain what amounts to a sham research program such that the attractive tax benefit
the Credit offers can be preserved. The Credit is ill-equipped to address such issues.
The regulation’s “substantially all” interpretation as applied to employee wages seemingly
offers more of an incentive for companies claim eighty percent of certain employee’s time was
research-related than it does to promote technological advancement through innovation and
experimentation.

It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where a business entity assigns

gratuitous supervisory or support tasks to satisfy the statute and tip the balance over the critical
threshold so the entire employee’s wage is a countable QRE.201 In fact, mere brainstorming
activities have been held to satisfy the test.202 Even with the most scrupulous accounting, it does
not seem likely that eighty-one percent of an employee’s time is tantamount to a one hundred
percent commitment to research. It would seem plausible that nineteen percent more dedication
would have an equally measureable benefit. Of course, if the eighty percent figure is arrived at
using an overgenerous gloss the problem is exacerbated. This is especially troubling in light of
the fact that wages make up the majority of QREs for most taxpayers.203
The resulting classification of salary as a QRE may redound to the benefit of offsetting an
entity’s tax bill, but society foots the bill when legitimate research commensurate with the wage
allocation does not occur.204 The aims of promoting innovation and economic progress are
forestalled when a company’s research investment is merely illusory. Unless genuine research is
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conducted, no subsidy should be extended.205 Moreover, extending a subsidy for no return in
societal benefit patently offends the aim of minimizing costs to federal revenue.
There may also be a detrimental effect on employee upward mobility. For instance, consider
a deserving employee whose promotion would mean her involvement in research activity would
fall below the almighty eighty-percent threshold. In such a scenario, the employer may realize
that said employee’s wage is no longer completely eligible as a QRE, thereby increasing the outof-pocket cost to the company. While undocumented, an unfortunate scenario can be imagined
whereby eligibility for an anticipated tax credit may factor into the calculus of employee
development and career trajectory. These problems are particularly evident in small businesses,
such as an ESB, where employees are likely to assume multiple duties.206 Overzealous estimates
of employee time dedicated to research and tenuous classification of research activities is
difficult to police in a small business environment, especially when relying on the self-reporting
construct.207
B. The Current Tax Environment Threatens the R&D Tax Credit’s Purpose
The PATH Act and TCJA open the door for entities to exploit the Credit at a great cost the
very society it is intended to benefit. Ideally, the Credits available would be assessed as the
difference between the value of the research to the company and the value of the research to
society.208 The value of the research to the company is expected to be realized through the
beneficial return in the form of profit. The contemplated benefit to society is new knowledge
that leads to innovation and economic growth.209 The cost of the societal benefit is federal
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revenue used to subsidize non-trivial research that would not otherwise have been conducted
absent an incentive.210 The issue is that the PATH Act and TCJA’s provisions significantly
altered the tax landscape but failed to rebalance costs. Specifically, the changes made were not
offset by revenue increases or expenditure decreases.211
The TCJA threatens the integrity of the Credit.

Inflating QREs in a given tax year

maximizes the potential tax break because the Credit is directly proportional to QREs.212 As
previously discussed, the TCJA’s elimination of AMT for corporations and its reduction in the
corporate income tax rate significantly increases the dollar-for-dollar tax offsetting power of the
Credit.213 Since the Credit is directly applied to offset income, it becomes much more likely for
a claimed Credit to exceed the taxpayer’s entire liability, resulting in a surplus.214 But what
value does a stockpile actually have? There may be an erroneously perceived value of a Credit
stockpile. A company may derive some form of comfort in knowing that the surplus may one
day be used to offset unanticipated income tax liability. But the stockpile may grow to such an
extent that it is virtually unusable. The increased potency of the Credit afforded by the TCJA
and the incentive to overinflate QREs may very well lead to a surplus of this magnitude. If an
entity realizes that its R&D Credit dollars have no utility to offset actual tax, it may simply cease
to invest in research. If this occurs, the R&D Tax Credit has functioned contravene its purpose.
It no longer creates an incentive to invest in incremental research, economic progress through
research does not occur, innovation and its positive spill-over effects halt, and the overall benefit
to society is no longer achieved.
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As the Code typically allows, to the extent that business credit dollars exceed income tax
liability they may be carried back (i.e. applied to previous open tax years) or carried forward (i.e.
applied to future tax liability).215 In fact, surplus Credit may be carried forward to each of next
twenty years.216 The carry back and carry forward provisions apply to all taxpayers, including:
corporations, partnerships, and individuals.217 The same kind of benefit is available to a taxpayer
making the Code section 280(C)(c) election, allowing for a tandem R&D Tax Credit and Tax
Deduction.218 As we have seen, the likelihood for surplus is increased in that context as well due
the Credit’s tax offsetting potency afforded by the TCJA.
Due to carryover provisions, the Credit can continue to offset tax liability even long after the
investment in research activity was made and recovered.219 Recall the stated justification for the
Credit was to foster investment in innovation because it was deemed essential to U.S. economic
progress.220 The subsidy was intended to redound to the benefit of society, writ large.221 Absent
a benefit to society, the Credit has no legitimate purpose.222 The R&D Tax Credit’s original
objective does not contemplate continuing tax relief for research that has already concluded or
halted.223 Due to the liberalized construction of QREs and the implications of the TCJA, a Credit
surplus is far more likely today than it was in 1986.224 Where other operating provisions of the
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Code—such as carryovers—are incorporated, the result should be consistent with the aims of the
evaluative framework.
C. The R&D Tax Credit to Offset Payroll Tax Liability
The R&D Tax Credit can function to offset payroll tax liability.225 As previously described,
the PATH Act made it possible for certain entities to claim the R&D Tax Credit in the form of a
payroll tax credit used to offset required employer contributions to OASDI.226 Recall, OASDI
contributions represent the social security portion of virtually every employer’s payroll tax
liability arising out of FICA.227 Social security is funded through payroll taxes, with half of the
tax paid for by the employer and the other half paid for by the employee.228 Receiving the Credit
in this form is not available to all taxpayers; the entity must be considered a QSB to be
eligible.229 To be deemed a QSB, the entity must first operate as a partnership, corporation, or
sole proprietorship.230 Next, gross receipts must not exceed $5 million in the current tax year.231
Finally, there can be no gross receipts at all for any tax year immediately preceding the five-year
period ending with the current tax year.232 A QSB more closely aligns with the colloquial
understanding of a start-up company, although a mature company can technically qualify.
If eligible as a QSB, the entity can elect to apply a portion or all of the R&D Tax Credit
toward employer OASDI contributions for up to five years.233 Applying the Credit in this
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manner is generally limited to the lesser of: (1) a $250,000 cap; (2) the Credit computed for the
current year; or (3) the amount of any business credit carry forward under Code section 39 that is
carried from the tax year when the election was made.234 Recall that if the computed R&D
payroll Tax credit exceeds the statutory limits, surplus may be carried forward.235 Under ideal
circumstances then, a QSB can theoretically offset $1.25 million over a five year period.236
The Credit is available to offset employer payroll tax liability for QSBs that have no net
income or even incur a net operating loss.237 The credit’s utility, however, does not vanish in the
event that a QSB turns a profit.238 While the amount of credit that can be channeled to offset
OASDI payroll tax liability is capped, nothing in the statute precludes apportioning the credit to
both to income and payroll tax.239 QSBs can decide for themselves how to best utilize Credit
dollars to offset OASDI payroll tax liability and income tax liability exceeding twenty-five
percent of over $25,000.240 With the TCJA’s reduction in corporate tax rates, the Credit’s tax
offsetting potency—making it more likely that surplus of Credits will be generated. These
consequences flow whether or not the Credit is used to offset payroll or income tax liability.
Such a framework unfairly enhances the benefit to QSBs.
The payroll tax credit election was designed to incentivize new, risk-taking firms and
encourage private-sector decisions that prioritize investment in research and development as
opposed to disproportionately subsidizing research activities of large established firms.241 The
philosophy was to use the R&D Tax Credit to make labor less expensive for nascent companies
234
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heavily invested in research who would otherwise be unable to access its conventional tax
benefits because it is unlikely they would generate income early on.242 In the advent of the
current tax regime, a QSB can choose when to begin amassing a Credit stockpile. The QSB can
simply elect how many Credits generated should be apportioned to offset income, payroll tax
liability, or carried forward.243 Economic growth is primary justification for tax credits in
general.244 As we have seen, a stockpile can exceed its utility when a company cannot use the
Credits to offset QREs. A start-up may then conclude that it should halt investing in research—
the very issue Congress sought to eliminate when the payroll tax credit option was installed for
QSBs.245

If this occurs, the aims of promoting innovative and incremental research are

threatened and progress stagnates.
At least two scenarios involving abuse by QSB owners are possible and cannot be tolerated.
First, a QSB owner may be able to obtain a government subsidy for a sham investment. Selfclassification and reporting enable QSBs to liberally categorize expenses as QREs.246
Artificially inflating QREs is not a unique problem to QSBs,247 but its effect is particularly
egregious when considering OASDI funding is potentially at stake. Under the “substantially all”
rule, QREs can be significantly increased by including entire paid wages if it is estimated that
research activities comprise at least eighty percent of the employee’s time.248

Research

investments and efforts are not monitored, and the four-part test does not require any measurable
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objective be achieved.249

Indeed, the taxpayer largely decides which research is worth

conducting, how to invest, and what is to be done with the results; a research plan is not
necessary to claim the credit.250 This affords too much discretion to QSB owners. With some
ingenuity, a savvy QSB owner can leverage the credit to completely avoid millions in FICA
payroll taxes obligation over five years—without ever delivering any measurable technological
advancement to society.251 Such an outcome is likely either due to superficial research or
artificially inflating QREs. Meanwhile, the employee must pay her income tax with no relief.252
In this scenario, the federal government has diverted revenue for no meaningful benefit to
society.
The second consequence arises out of the flexibility afforded to the QSB to decide whether to
apply its Credit to payroll taxes, income taxes, or some combination thereof. With the advent of
the TCJA, Credits have much more tax-offsetting value, and tax planning can effectively
engender a Credit stockpile that can be carried forward up to twenty years.253 Such a posture can
facilitate a chilling and nefarious maneuver in the QSB context. Consider, for instance, a QSB
that employs a skilled researcher. This researcher’s salary can be completely assignable as a
QRE if at least eighty-percent of her time devoted to qualified research activities.254 The QSB
may apply the claimed Credit as a payroll tax credit for up to five years and reduce out-of-pocket
costs for its human capital investment.255 If this research then becomes profitable, resulting in
income tax liability, the QSB may shift Credit allocation to use some or all of the Credit to offset
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its liability, and choice can be made each year.256 The TCJA operates to reduce corporate taxes
and increase the tax-offsetting force of the credit, making carry forward of a Credit surplus more
likely. Because ongoing research is not required to utilize the Credit stockpile, there is no
safeguard for the researcher’s job.

A nefarious owner driven by avarice could have the

government subsidize a portion of his workforce for five years, reap the payroll tax benefit while
stockpiling surplus credits, terminate R&D initiative/employee, and apply the Credit toward
income tax into the future for twenty years. Indeed this would require a five year development
cycle and there is a theoretical limit to the pro rata tax benefit, but the possibility exists. Such a
high social welfare and tax revenue cost was not a contemplated outcome in 1981.
D. Restructuring to Minimize Exploitation and Restore Purpose
The current framework for claiming the R&D tax credit needs to be adjusted to realign its
purpose in the context of the current tax regime. The R&D Tax Credit’s own codifying section
has remained largely unchanged in the advent of the PATH Act and TCJA.257 As we have seen,
the interplay with other Code sections creates powerful incentives to exploit its liberalized rules
and increases the likelihood that a Credit stockpile will be generated. This is not to say the entire
R&D Tax Credit has run its useful course, as others have contended.258 Recall that the R&D Tax
Credit has been assumed by some authorities to induce two dollars of spending for every one
credit dollar realized.259 The Credit represents over $20 billion in spending though, and such an
expenditure demands careful scrutiny.260

A sum of this magnitude can be positively

transformative if deployed to obtain new knowledge and promote the positive externalities
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discussed earlier.261 Two modifications are suggested to redress the Credit’s vulnerabilities.
First, a taxpayer’s ability to look back and open prior tax years to generate the Credit needs to be
restricted. Second, the Regulations need to be revised to mandate more exacting control over
qualified research expenditures (“QREs”). Each of these remedial measures is discussed in turn.
Taxpayers should be restricted from opening prior tax years and claiming the R&D Tax
credit. Currently, an entity may look back to an open tax year and claim the credit by filing an
amended return.262 The Alternative Simplified Credit computation method may be used to
streamline this process, minimizing the documentation requirement in favor of a percentage
calculation of QREs.263 It is against a fundamental aim of the credit to be reimbursed for past
research activities. Recall that the Credit was intended to stimulate investment in development
activities that would not otherwise have been undertaken in its absence.264 Prior investments in
research clearly do not comport with this requirement as the research effort and expenditure
already occurred and whatever investment made was presumably recovered.

This kind of

research patently would have occurred without the Credit. When the PATH Act made the Credit
permanent the public was placed on actual notice of its existence, thereby neutralizing any
claims of ignorance. If the Credit is not claimed in a timely manner, the presumption should be
the investment in research would have otherwise been made, obviating the need for the Credit’s
tax-offsetting value; therefore, absent extenuating circumstances, a taxpayer should not be
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entitled to retroactive relief.

Indeed, other mechanisms besides a tax subsidy can provide

adequate incentive for innovation, such as research grants.265
Opening prior tax years to claim the Credit is particularly egregious with the onset of the
TCJA. As described above, eliminating AMT and reducing corporate tax rate increases the taxoffsetting power of the Credit.266 This is so because the preliminary tax liability is necessarily
reduced when the tax rate is reduced, and the Credit offsets this figure dollar-for-dollar—thereby
increasing in force. A straightforward tax planning maneuver is to open all eligible tax years in
an attempt to stockpile the maximum amount of Credits, and then apply them to future income
tax. As we have seen, a credit stockpile can threaten all six aims of our evaluative framework.
The R&D Tax Credit should not be applied with the benefit of hindsight as part of a tax
planning strategy. Permitting such activity affords businesses far too much discretion and
advantage when computing and claiming the credit. It also provides perhaps the strongest
incentive for over inflating QREs so the maximum Credit’s will be generated.267 For the Credit
to be justified, societal benefits must at least balance the revenue costs.268 Inflating QREs does
nothing to promote innovation, experimentation, or incremental research activities. It does,
however, expend revenue and detract from economic progress. In this case, the expected value
to the company far exceeds the value to society.
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The framework for allocating QREs needs to be re-worked. Specifically, the eighty percent
threshold used to allocate the entirety of an employee’s wage as a QRE should be eliminated.269
The statutory four-part test as construed by the courts remains useful for qualifying certain inhouse expenditures, but it is less suited to wages.270 Indeed, the largest component of R&D
expenditures is employee wages and benefits.271 The eighty percent rule encourages those who
stand to benefit most from the credit to simply “round up” in an overzealous appraisal when
recounting the extent of employee direct, supervisory, and support functions connected to
research.272 After all, it is easiest and most beneficial for the taxpayer to simply consider an
employee’s entire wage as a QRE—especially when such an optimistic accounting will
maximize the tax credit.273

The interests of administrative feasibility, compliance, and

maximizing the aggregate QRE are all competing; however, a guestimate simply lacks the
sophistication necessary to serve as a workable solution.
In the current digital age, it is not an insurmountable task to account for an employee’s
contribution accurately and honestly. Tools prepared by major accounting and technology firms
are readily available that can assist with apportioning employee time.274 Even if investment in an
enterprise solution is not feasible, simple standard operating procedure can fill the void. This
269
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can be accomplished through timesheets, payroll legers, and reports so that an individual’s time
and wages are costed to specific projects.275 It may also be helpful to assign a standardized job
description to a researcher, supervisor, or assistant that captures the extent to which certain
qualifying functions are carried out. Given the increased force each credit dollar now carries and
the myriad options available to account for an employee’s time, it is not appropriate to simply
assume wages are QREs under the presumption that eighty percent is tantamount to the whole.
Here, the value of an inflated estimate to the company far exceeds the value provided to society.
IV.

Conclusion

The R&D Tax Credit was introduced in 1981 with a noble purpose: stimulate innovation and
economic progress by incentivizing entities to invest in obtaining new knowledge through the
scientific process of experimentation.276 From the initial policy we have deduced evaluative
measures of promoting economic progress, fostering innovation, encouraging experimentation,
recognizing incremental research, minding federal revenue cost, and maximizing societal benefit.
Contemporary tax policy and liberalized rules have reshaped the utility of the Credit. As a result
of the PATH Act and the TCJA, the R&D Tax Credit now has unprecedented dollar-for-dollar
tax offsetting potency. In this context, a taxpayer today can unfairly generate a Credit stockpile
that has the potential to offend all six of the aims in our framework.
While the current tax environment incentivizes exploitation at great cost to society, the
fostering spirit of the credit remains its salvation. Removing and amending certain features of
the R&D Tax Credit can restore its integrity and revitalize its salutary purpose. In sum, the R&D
Tax Credit is a worthy feature that can have a positive influence on the U.S. economy; however,
this can only be accomplished if the cost of the subsidy balances with its value to society.
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